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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I investigate numerically how three different scenarios of a Post-Kyoto 
agreement for the commitment period 2013-2017 affect the overall emission abatement, 
the cost of compliance and the price for emission permits in both the Kyoto (2008-2012) 
and the Post-Kyoto periods. The scenarios affect both periods through the banking rule; 
one of the compliance rules governing the emission trade mechanism in the Kyoto 
Protocol. In my results, banking reduces the overall cost of abatement and shifts 
abatement from the subsequent period to the present, when the Post-Kyoto emission 
targets are lower than in the present period. Due to over allocation of permits in the 
Kyoto period, so called “hot air”, it also causes a higher overall emissions, compared to a 
non-banking version of the same market, due to the possibility of bringing surplus 
permits from the Kyoto period into the next period. The numerical analysis in this thesis 
has been done using GAMS. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the rules governing the emission trade mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is the so 
called banking, or carry-over rule. This allows the participants to save emission permits 
from one commitment period to the next. Looking at the two first commitment periods in 
the Kyoto Protocol, I will do a numerical analysis of how banking influence the 
abatement in each period, the total compliance cost and the emission permit price in the 
market. 
 
What makes banking interesting is that it connects the commitment periods. If the 
international community agrees that it is important to start reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions sooner, rather than later, connecting the periods could help achieving this by 
letting stricter abatement targets in the future influence the current market. 
  
The banking rule was agreed upon in the Marrakesh Accords from 2001 and together 
with the other rules for the emission trading, it now governs the emission permit market 
in the first Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012). How the banking rule will affect 
abatement across two periods, the total compliance cost and the permit prices, can only 
be determined once a follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol is agreed upon. This Post-Kyoto 
agreement will set the framework for the next commitment period (2013-17). Currently, 
this agreement is supposed to be finalized in Copenhagen in December 2009. Therefore, 
in order to be able to examine the banking rule numerically, I have had to make 
assumptions regarding what this agreement will look like.  
 
According to Springer (2003) making assumptions on a possible Post-Kyoto agreement is 
“highly speculative”, which is why I have included three different scenarios. The first is a 
duplicate of the Kyoto Protocol in one more period; in the second scenario the same 
countries take on emission targets as in the current agreement, but the targets are stricter. 
Finally a third scenario is assumed where USA, China and India also commits to the 
scheme, and overall emission reduction targets are tightened even further. I look at the 
consequences of each of the scenarios with and without banking. 
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In theoretical works since Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Rubin (1996) it has been 
established that banking can lower the total abatement cost for participants in an emission 
trading scheme with abatement goals set across more than one period. Also empirical 
reviews of the U.S. Acid Rain Program which allowed banking, show that intertemporal 
trade reduces overall compliance cost and shifts abatement forward in time, i.e. 
abatement is done earlier (Ellerman and Montero, 2007). 
 
My results follow these works in showing that if a second commitment period to the 
Kyoto Protocol is stricter than the current, banking will lead to an increased emission 
abatement in the current period. I also find that the total mitigation cost is considerably 
lower due to the possibility of smoothing abatement cost across both periods, and not 
only across regions of the world.  
 
In my opinion, the results also show that the much debated problem of “hot air” can 
partly be solved by banking. This problem is widely documented in the literature (see for 
example Manne and Richels, 2004 or Springer and Varilek, 2004), and has its base in the 
fact that that the endowments in the Kyoto period are larger than the demand for emission 
permits in the same period. Without banking, this “hot air” means that both the cost of 
compliance and the price of emission permits in the first commitment period is nil, 
assuming no strategic behavior by the holders of the “hot air”. Such strategic behavior 
could be forming cartels or acting as a monopolist. With banking and gradually tighter 
emission schemes in the future, these excess permits are brought into the next periods and 
utilized.  
 
If the goal is to achieve emission reduction sooner, rather than later, my results show that 
this can be achieved even with excess permits in the first period, given banking. Total 
emissions across the two periods does however rise with banking due to the same fact: 
The excess permits in a non-banking market are not used, while in a banking market they 
are used in the next period. 
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Due to the many assumptions I have had to make, the validity of my numerical results is 
limited. Especially excluding the possibility of strategic behavior in the current period 
seems unrealistic if the price otherwise would be zero. The general conclusion is, in my 
opinion, still valid: Banking shifts abatement forward (abatement is done earlier, rather 
than later) if new, stricter abatement goals are in place for subsequent periods and the 
overall mitigation savings are considerable. This thesis shows this numerically, utilizing 
the actual endowments of the Kyoto period, estimated cost functions for the participating 
regions and assumptions on a future agreement. 
 
The thesis has the following structure: I start by giving a brief background on the Kyoto 
Protocol, the markets for emission permits and the rules that govern it in chapter 2. A 
brief review of the literature on intertemporal emission trade is also included. In chapter 3 
I set up a model for emission trading with banking, followed by the numerical 
simulations of the market in chapter 4. The simulations are done using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). In chapter 5, I discuss the results in light of the 
limitations there are to my model, data and results. Finally, in chapter 6, I make some 
concluding remarks about my results. The appendix is a transcript of the GAMS program 
I have used, with the results. 
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2. Background 
 
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and 
ice and rising global average sea level (…) Most of the increase in global temperatures 
since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
[greenhouse gas] concentrations.” (Climate Change 2007, Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007) 
 
2007 was the year when the IPCC concluded that it is very likely that human activity 
since 1750 has been a major contributor to the global warming (anthropogenic 
emissions). They also concluded that this might have severe economic and human 
consequences for the world, and finally that actions trying to mitigate these effects need 
to be taken sooner rather than later in order to be able to stabilize, and eventually turn this 
trend.  
 
Global warming has however been an issue in international politics since the 1980s. In 
1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, more commonly known as the “Earth Summit”, the UN Framework Convention 
on Climatic Change (UNFCCC) was signed. This is a treaty aimed at stabilizing the 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere in order to prevent dangerous climatic 
changes. Today 192 countries have ratified the UNFCCC, including the USA. 
 
The governing body of UNFCCC is the Conference of Parties (COP) which has been 
hosted almost every year since. In 1997, at the COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, the most famous 
and important update (Protocol) to the UNFCCC was agreed upon: The Kyoto Protocol. 
This was the first time the developed countries, known as the Annex I countries of the 
UNFCCC, agreed to reduce emissions in a legally binding document. In the Kyoto 
Protocol, the developed countries are listed in Annex B, thus Annex I of the UNFCCC 
and Annex B countries of the Protocol are synonymous. I will refer to them as Annex I 
countries in this thesis.  
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2.1 The Kyoto Protocol 
 
In the Kyoto Protocol, the Annex I countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
during the first commitment period from 2008-12 by 5% compared to the countries’ 
1990-emission. Each of the participating countries are given emission endowments 
allowing them to emit their agreed amount for the five-year period. 
 
The major difference between the UNFCCC and the Protocol was that while the former 
encouraged the developed countries to stabilize greenhouse gas emission, the latter 
commits them to do so1. In order to enter into force, the Protocol states that 55 countries 
and countries that are responsible for at least 55% of the 1990 Annex I emissions has to 
ratify it. After the Protocol was finalized in 1997, it entered into force in 2005, following 
the ratification by Russia. Today 180 countries have ratified the Protocol (including non-
Annex I countries) representing about 63,7% of the 1990 Annex I emissions. The major 
Annex I  exception is USA who has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
In order to reach their overall 5% reduction goal, the Annex I countries have been given 
three flexible mechanisms, also known as the Kyoto Mechanisms: Joint Implementation 
(JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emission Trading. The banking rule 
that I will examine in the following chapters is one of the rules governing the Emission 
Trading mechanism. Here is a short survey of the three mechanisms (Malvik and 
Westskog, 2001): 
 
• Joint Implementation (JI) 
This is a credit-trading program which allows Annex I countries to undertake emission 
reduction projects in other Annex I countries where the resulting emission reduction 
partly or totally helps the financing country reach their own Kyoto target. Both parties 
must approve of the arrangement. 
 
                                                
1 Facts regarding the Protocol are taken from: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The CDM mechanism is a modified version of the JI mechanism. It is designed to help 
developing countries (non-Annex I countries) achieve sustainable development and to 
help Annex I countries meet their reduction targets. An Annex I country can assist the 
developing country through technological and financial inflows to develop more energy 
efficient industry and consequently reduced emission of greenhouse gases. The Annex I 
country can use the emission reduction in these projects to achieve their own abatement 
goals. 
 
• Emission Trading 
This is the mechanism that has received most attention, and it gives the Annex I countries 
the flexibility to smooth their abatement cost both spatially and temporally through 
trading the emission endowments. The committed countries can sell and buy the endowed 
emission permits to and from other Annex I countries. The theory of emission permit 
trade is presented in detail in chapter 3. 
 
In addition to these mechanisms, the Marrakesh Accords (from COP 7 in Marrakesh, 
Marroco 2001), require that: “domestic actions (as opposed to use of the mechanisms) 
constitute a significant element of the efforts made by each Annex I Party to meet its 
target under the Kyoto Protocol”2. No quantified target is set as to how much of the 
abatement need to be done domestically. A further explanation of the rules of the 
Marrakesh Accords follows in the next section. 
 
During the 10 years since the Protocol was signed until the first commitment period 
started on January 1, 2008, some major issues have occurred. Most noticeable is the fact 
that after the change of administration in the USA in 2001, they decided not to ratify the 
agreement. This means that the largest demander for permits is out of the market. 
 
A consequence of the non-participation of the US is that the amount of permits in the 
market will exceed the Business-As-Usual demand for permits (BAU  demand: 
                                                
2 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php 
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Unconstrained demand for emission permits) in the first commitment period. This is 
mainly caused by the fact that the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union already have Business-As-Usual emissions below their 1990-level due to their 
inefficient industries in 1990 (Manne and Richels, 2004). In my numerical simulations 
this so called “hot air” will affect the results.  
 
In December 2007, at COP 13 at Bali, Indonesia, a course was set out to make a follow-
up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. This agreement will run in the next commitment 
period from 2013-2017, and is planned to be finalized in 2009, at COP 15 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
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2.2 The Rules of the Market and Borrowing  
 
The Marrakesh Accords is a detailed description of the rules for the emission trading 
mechanism. In the following I describe in brief the four major rules (Godal and Klaassen, 
2006). The periods in these rules refer to the 5-year long commitment periods. 
 
• The commitment period reserve rule states that the countries must keep a reserve of 
permits equal to at least 90% of the endowments or 100% of the most recently reviewed 
emission inventory. This rule has been created to make sure none of the Annex I 
countries “over-sell” permits and then are not able to reach their emission target. 
 
• The banking, or carry-over rule, allows the countries to be in over-compliance in one 
period and save the surplus permits to the next period. 
 
• The restoration rate rule states that for each permit a country is short in the first period, 
1.3 permits are to be subtracted from the next period’s endowment. 
 
• The suspension rule states that countries borrowing permits in one period will be 
suspended from the right to sell permits in the next period, until they return to 
compliance. 
 
The restoration rate and suspension rules govern what would be borrowing in the Kyoto 
framework. I have not included this in my analysis, and a few comments should made as 
to the reasons for this: 
  
The restoration rate rule says that if a country borrows, i.e. is non-compliant in the first 
commitment period (emits more pollution than the permits allow), a 30% “interest rate” 
is paid on every permit borrowed from the next period. Saving, or banking, permits can 
be done at a one-to-one basis. There is thus a strong disincentive for borrowing. In 
addition to this, the suspension rule stipulates that if there has been borrowing, the 
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country is not allowed to sell permits in the subsequent period until it is back in 
compliance.  
 
Intuitively, it is reasonable to believe that borrowing will be relevant in the situation 
where the price of permits is higher in the first than in the second period. Assuming that 
the next agreement will be stricter than the Kyoto Protocol in respect to abatement goals, 
it would not seem probable that the price would fall. Also, the fact that the endowments 
in the Kyoto period are larger than the demand for permits in the same period, supports 
this intuition.  
 
According to Westskog (2000) borrowing would most likely reduce total abatement cost, 
but due to the strong indications that borrowing will not be an issue in the current Kyoto 
period from the next, I have chosen to exclude it from my analysis. 
 
The reason why borrowing has been left out of the Kyoto Protocol as a viable option is, 
according to Malvik and Westskog (2001), due to the fear of increased opportunities for 
free-riding. With the lack of a supranational authority to govern, a domestic change of 
government could change their policy regarding cooperation with the international 
community. If borrowing was widely used, it could be tempting for a government to 
withdraw from the agreement after the first period. 
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2.3 The Literature 
 
In this section I outline the theoretical background for the model I present in the next 
chapter.  
 
Since Montgomery (1972) the idea of using market-based emission trading has been 
present both in theory and in policy processes when developing emission trading 
schemes. His paper is partly based on the work done by Dales (1968), who is generally 
credited for introducing the notion that marketable emission permits may be used for 
pollution control (Perman et al., 2003, p. 239). Montgomery proves that an efficient 
market equilibrium exists for the emission market, given convex cost functions, and has 
been much cited for this results since. One conclusion is that for any given emission 
target, a market for tradable emission permits can achieve this at the lowest overall 
abatement cost.  
 
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) extends Montgomery’s static results to include dynamics in 
discrete time, and were among the first to scientifically examine the banking of permits 
across periods. At this time banking had already been implemented in the SO2 allowance 
trading scheme under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments in the USA. Ellerman and 
Montero (2007) provides an empirical evaluation of banking in this market. Rubin (1996) 
extends Cronshaw and Kruse’s model in continuous time, and includes borrowing. The 
conclusion from both Cronshaw and Kruse and Rubin is that with banking, a target level 
of emission over more than one time period will be reached at the lowest present value of 
cost. Essentially, it is the same logic as in Montgomery, except that the trade is not only 
allowed across sources, but also across periods. 
 
Finally, Kling and Rubin (1997) looks at the efficiency properties of a similar banking 
model, concluding that the private solution in a market where both banking and 
borrowing is allowed, does not always correspond to the social optimum. The reason is 
that with falling prices of emission permits in present-value, participants will want to 
borrow permits, resulting in excessive pollution damage in the first period compared to 
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the social optimum. They suggest a solution to this by outlining a modified banking 
system with disincentives to borrowing. The restoration rule of the Marrakesh Accords is 
an application of this result. 
 
Interesting literature regarding banking has been left out here since it examines aspects of 
the market not included in my analysis. Parts of this literature is commented on in chapter 
5 where I discuss my results. 
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3. The Model 
 
This is a presentation of a model representing the emission trading market of the Kyoto 
Protocol. First, the model is presented in one period. Later, the participants can save their 
permits to a subsequent period. The latter case is the full banking model in two periods 
that I program in GAMS and use for my numerical analysis in the proceeding chapter. I 
only analyze the numerical effects of the banking rule. The restoration rate rule, 
commitment period reserve rule and the suspension rule are thus not included in the 
model. 
 
I draw on several sources in this presentation, mainly Montgomery (1972), Hanley et al. 
(1997) and Perman et al. (2003) for the one-period model and Cronshaw and Kruse 
(1996) and Godal and Klaassen (2003, 2006) for the intertemporal model.  
 
The emission trading mechanism outlined in the Kyoto Protocol is based on the 
assumption that a market of rights to pollute will make abatement happen where, and 
when, it is of least cost. With a price related to pollution, participants3 are likely to 
include this as an argument in their total cost functions when minimizing costs, assuming 
they are cost minimizers. Through this process they decide what their emission level 
should be and subsequently whether to buy permits, or to abate emission. This is why a 
model like this is relevant when doing a numerical analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and its 
possible follow-up.  
                                                
3 “Participant” is in the following referring to the Annex I parties of the UNFCCC. 
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3.1 Assumptions 
 
• A “cap-and-trade” model.  
In the Kyoto framework a total cap is decided by international negotiations for the target 
of overall emission. The total amount of permits distributed equals this target level of 
emission, or the cap. Through the same international negotiations, it is decided how to 
distribute the permits between the polluting participants, i.e. how the individual emission 
targets should be. The total amount of permits in the market is always constant. 
 
• Emission permits can be freely traded between the participants. 
Within each commitment period, these permits can be traded freely at a one-for-one rate 
between the participants. Selling one permit, means abating one more unit of emission. 
There are no transaction costs considered. 
 
• n participants with different costs of emission abatement.  
In the Kyoto framework each participant is a national government. 
  
• Each participant has a set of permits allocated free of charge based on historical 
emissions (“Grandfathering”).  
Another way of distributing the permits among the participants could be by auction, or by 
just selling them at a predetermined price.  
 
• The participants can only emit pollution equal to the number of emission permits they 
have been granted or acquired through trade. 
I will assume that this restriction is respected by the participants. 
 
• The participants are cost minimizers. This is their only motive when deciding how many 
permits to hold. 
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• The markets are perfectly competitive and there is no strategic behavior.  
All the participants are price-takers with no individual market power. Neither will they 
form cartels with other participants to gain market power. 
 
• Emissions are uniformly mixing pollutants.  
The geographical source of the pollution is irrelevant. Uniformly mixing pollutants 
quickly disperse and affect the environment globally. Greenhouse gases is one example 
of a uniformly mixing pollutant. The model I present works well for these kinds of 
pollutants. If the emission do not have these properties, the model will not apply as two 
participants emissions may have different impacts on the environment at different places. 
 
• No participant will choose a level of pollution emissions higher than the one observed 
in the absence of emission regulations. 
This means that Business-As-Usual estimates are always the maximum the participants 
will emit. 
 
• There are no negative emissions. 
Measures such as planting trees in the rainforest or the capture of greenhouse gases in the 
seabed, and thus reducing the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, are not included in 
this model. 
 
• Only positive banking is allowed.  
When the model is expanded to two periods, the participants will be allowed to save 
permits for the next commitment period, but not borrow (negative banking) from it.  
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3.2 Emission Permit Trade in One Period 
 
In the following the subscript i represents the participants of this model. In the Kyoto 
framework, this is the national governments of the Annex I parties. xi denotes the amount 
of permits held by each participant. This equals the amount of emissions by each 
participant within this model. 
 
C
i
(x
i
)  is the cost function which is at the base of the following presentation. From 
Montgomery (1972) this function relates different levels of restricted emission to the cost 
of production for a cost minimizing participant.  
 
In the case where there is no restriction on emission, the participant will have no cost 
related to the emission C
i
(x
i
) = 0 . We also know that at x
i
= 0 , which is the case when 
no emissions are allowed, the participant will have the maximum possible costs related to 
emission. 
  
I assume that the cost function is twice differentiable and convex in xi, that is, Ci '(xi ) < 0  
and C
i
''(x
i
) > 0  which means that the cost related to emission for the participant 
decreases as xi increases. Intuitively, more emission means lower cost related to 
maintaining this level of emission, or in reverse: As emission restrictions become more 
severe, the cost of abatement increases as the least expensive measures to cut emissions 
are done first.  
 
3.2.1 Single participant optimization with exogenous prices 
 
With a function relating the emission level with cost, we can include the market for 
emission permits. The total cost function that the price-taking participants will minimize 
include the potential expenses of trading permits. ei represents the individual amount of 
permit endowments. The difference (xi-ei) is the amount of permits bought (positive 
difference) or sold (negative difference) at the exogenous market price p.  
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The total cost that the participants will minimize is: 
 
TCi (xi ) = Ci (xi ) + p(xi ! ei )   (3.1) 
 
The first order condition for the cost minimization is:  
 
!TCi (xi )
!xi
= Ci '(xi ) + p = 0             (3.2) 
 
The second order condition for the minimization is fulfilled since the cost function is 
assumed convex. Remembering that the cost function relates a cost to a certain level of 
emission, we can now observe that the marginal abatement cost (MAC), the negative of 
the marginal cost of emitting one more unit of the pollutant, is equal to the price of 
permits in optimum. Rearranging (3.2) we get: p = !Ci '(xi ) = MACi .  
 
A price taking, cost minimizing participant will therefore, in a situation where emission 
constraints are imposed, set emissions at a level where the marginal cost of abatement is 
equal to the price of emission permits. 
 
Intuitively, with a given price of permits, the participant will adjust emissions to the level 
where abating one additional unit of emission has the same cost as the price of the 
emission permits. With different cost functions, this level may vary between the 
participants. This guarantees that the emission abatement is done where it is of least cost. 
Let us consider the alternatives to see that (3.2) must give a minimum (remember that we 
are considering a single, price-taking firm):  
 
p < !Ci '(xi ) : The cost of abating another unit of pollution is above the price of pollution 
permits. Assuming that the participant has been given a restriction which is below their 
unrestricted demand for emissions, they would have an incentive to buy permits instead 
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of reducing emissions. This will happen until the participant reaches the level of emission 
where an additional permit will cost the same as reducing an emission unit.  
 
p > !Ci '(xi ) : For this participant it is of less cost to abate emission than to buy permits. 
This participant would rather abate emission than buy permits. If they have been 
allocated permits which allows them to emit pollutants at a level where the price of the 
permits is higher than their marginal abatement cost, they can make a profit from selling 
some permits and reducing emissions. This will happen until they reach a level of 
emission where the cost of reducing another unit equals the price of the permits. And we 
are back to the total cost minimum situation described above. 
 
If we had assigned functional values to the cost function, we could have solved the first 
order condition in (3.2) with respect to xi to find an expression for the demand of 
emission permits from participant i, with respect to the price, x
i
(p) . In the next 
subsection this will be used when adding up all the individual demands in the market. 
 
3.2.2 The market clearing 
 
If we add these individual demands for all n participants, and set this equal to the total 
amount of permits in the market:  
 
x
i
(p) = e
i
i=1
n
!
i=1
n
!          (3.3)  
 
and solve for p, we find the market price of emission permits. (3.3) thus represents the 
market clearing condition for a simple emission permit system. It is quite intuitive: The 
total amount of individual emissions in the market can never be higher than the target of 
total emissions defined by the “cap” or total amount of endowments. This was also one of 
my assumptions.  
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3.2.3 Computing the equilibrium 
 
Finding the market price can also be done using Lagrange. The market problem is to 
minimize the total costs (TC) of all the participants in the market:  
TC
Market
= C
i
(x
i
)
i=1
n
!  
 
minTC
Market  subject to x
i
= e
i
i=1
n
!
i=1
n
!   
 
Assigning a multiplier !  to the constraint, the Lagrangian for this problem becomes: 
 
 
!(x
i
,!) = C
i
(x
i
) + ! x
i
" e
i
i=1
n
#
i=1
n
#$%&
'
()
i=1
n
#   (3.4) 
 
which gives us the first order condition: 
 
 
!!
!x
i
= C
i
' x
i( ) + " = 0              (3.5) 
 
and our market clearing restriction: 
 
x
i
= e
i
i=1
n
!
i=1
n
!  
 
We see that (3.5) is equal to (3.2), but instead of the price, we have a constant multiplier 
expressing a shadow price which can be read as the market price of permits. It also shows 
that all marginal abatement costs will be set equal to the price in the market equilibrium 
for the least cost solution. This result is the same as we attained for the single participant 
and essential for any emission trading models. 
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3.3 Emission Permit Trade in Two Periods 
 
Now I extend the model to a second period4. I also allow the polluting participants to 
save their pollution permits from period 1 to period 2. The price of the permits may vary 
between the periods, but I assume the market ends after period 2, so a permit has no value 
after the end of this period. The sum of the permit endowments in the second period 
might be larger (a looser agreement), or smaller (a stricter agreement) than in the 
previous period. Also individual endowments might change from one period to the next. 
The main reasons for such a variation will be that more participants take on emission 
targets, or that the governments of the already committed nations change their targets for 
emission abatement.  
 
The reasons for allowing banking are roughly the same as for allowing permit trade at all. 
In the previous section we saw how permit trade enabled the market to allocate 
abatements to the participants with least marginal abatement cost within one period. 
Opening up the trade, not only between participants within one period, but also between 
periods, gives an even larger opportunity to smooth abatement costs and allowing the 
pollution targets to be reached at a least aggregate cost over all periods (Rubin, 1996).  
 
It is important to distinguish between intertemporal trade within the commitment periods 
and between subsequent commitment periods. In the former, both saving and borrowing 
is allowed, but in the latter case only saving is. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 The second commitment period in the Kyoto framework runs in 2013-2017. 
20 
3.3.1 Single participant optimization with exogenous price 
 
A comment on notation: The superscript in the following denotes time, t = 1,2 . Since the 
model only include two periods I will denote periods by the number of the period rather 
than the general t . When expressions are of such a nature that it can be valid for both 
periods, I will denote this by t. 
 
si represents savings or banking. This is the amount of permits that are brought from the 
first to the second period. This can never be a negative number (which would be 
borrowing). !  denotes the discount factor. 
 
Formally, the total cost function for the two period emission trading model with banking 
for a single participant is: 
 
TCi (xi
1
, xi
2
, si ) = Ci
1
(xi
1
) + p
1
(xi
1 ! ei
1
+ si ) + " Ci
2
(xi
1
, xi
2
) + p
2
(xi
2 ! ei
2 ! si )#$ %&  (3.6) 
 
The total cost function in (3.6) is analogue to (3.1), but this time I have included a second 
period and saving. 
 
To find the discounted total I have included ! =
1
1+ r
"
#$
%
&'
years
 as the discount factor, where  
r = real interest rate and it is raised by the number of years of the commitment period. 
The trading part of each period is the same as in (3.1), but savings are added in the first 
period, and subtracted in the second.  
 
Intuitively, this is because x
i
t , being the actual holding of emission permits in each 
period, must be covered by either the endowments e
i
t , or the permits participants buy (or 
have banked, for the second period).  
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If e
i
1
< x
i
1  then (x
i
1
! e
i
1
+ s
i
) > 0 , which means that permits have to be bought to cover the 
difference. If participants choose to save permits in addition to this, it must also be added. 
The sum of permits bought to cover their demand and the saving, has to be acquired at 
the price in the first period.  
 
If e
i
1
> x
i
1 then (x
i
1
! e
i
1
+ s
i
)  can be zero, if the excess permits are saved; negative, if the 
excess permits are sold in the first period; and finally positive, if they choose to save 
more than their excess permits. If the participant is a net seller in the first period, the sum 
of the trade is negative, and subtracted from the total cost. If they are net buyers, the 
positive sum is added to the cost. 
 
The logic works in reverse in the second period. If the amount of endowed permits is less 
than the demand for permits, the difference must be covered by buying permits, or by 
having permits banked from the first period. This is why the savings has to be subtracted 
in this period. 
 
As we see from (3.6), the cost function can vary from the first period to the second. This 
can happen in two ways: By general exogenous technological development in the 
economy, which is denoted by the time-superscript to Ci; or through the emission 
reductions they undertook in the first period, which is why the second phase emission 
cost function not only depend on the second period demand for emission permits, x
i
2 , but 
also x
i
1 . This could be the installation of new equipment or R & D costs undertaken by 
the participant in the first period, which also reduces the cost of emission in period 2.  
 
In the following I will let the general technological development be the only way the 
second phase emission cost functions can change; thus C
i
2  only depends on x
i
2 . 
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The minimization problem of the individual participant is: 
 
min TC
i
(x
i
1
, x
i
2
, s
i
)  subject to 
s
i
! 0
s
i
" e
i
1
i=1
n
#
$
%
&
'
&
(
)
&
*
&
  (3.7) 
 
The first restriction simply states that saving has to be non-negative, i.e. borrowing is 
forbidden, which is consistent with what I have assumed from the beginning. The second 
one is included since there cannot be saved more permits than exists in the market. In an 
extreme case with these restrictions, one participant could save all the permits in the 
market, and then nobody else would be able to save. The restrictions would still be valid 
however, since if a participant do not save, they still fulfill the restriction. 
 
When we associate constant Lagrange multipliers with the constraints, we can define the 
Lagrangian function: 
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  (3.8) 
I assume interior solutions for x
i
1  and x
i
2 . The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
 
 
!!(")
!xi
1
= Ci
1
'(xi
1
) + p
1
= 0   (3.9) 
 
 
!!(")
!xi
2
= #Ci
2
'(xi
2
) + #p2 = 0   (3.10) 
 
 
!!(")
!s
i
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1 # $p2 # %
1
+ %
2
= 0   (3.11) 
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s
i
! 0   (3.12) 
 
!
1
" 0 ; !
1
s
i
= 0   (3.13) 
 
s
i
! e
i
1
i=1
n
"   (3.14) 
 
!
2
" 0 ; !2 (si " ei
t
i=1
n
# ) = 0   (3.15) 
 
Rearranging (3.9) and (3.10), we find a familiar result: p1 = !Ci
1
'(xi
1
)  and 
p
2
= !Ci
2
'(xi
2
) , namely that optimal emission levels at minimum total cost are at the 
points where the permit price equals the marginal abatement cost in each period. 
 
Remembering that we are in a perfect market where no participants exert market power, 
we can now discuss the possible relationships between the permit price in period 1 and 
period 2. For the moment these prices are assumed exogenous. 
 
If p1 > !p2  we see from (3.11) that !
1
 has to be positive. From (3.13) this implies that  
si = 0, i.e. no banking. This means that if the price of permits in the first period is higher 
than the discounted permit price in the second period, the participant will not save 
permits. Knowing this, we also see from (3.15) that !
2
= 0 . This is how the model 
restricts negative saving (borrowing).  
 
If p1 < !p2  we see from (3.11) that !
2
 has to be positive, which again means that in 
(3.15), s
i
= e
i
1
i=1
n
! . This is a positive saving, but not only that, with the discounted price of 
permits higher in the next period than in the current period (remember that so far prices 
are assumed exogenously given), the participants will have incentives to save all they 
can. This is only restricted by the upper limit set by the total amount of permits in the 
economy in period 1. Thus in the case of the price differential going this way, a single 
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participant would try to acquire and save all the permits available in the market. 
Intuitively it is hard to believe that this can be an equilibrium in the market, since it 
means all participants will want to save all permits. I will return to this when the market 
solution is discussed. 
  
If p1 = !p2 , expression (3.11) can only be satisfied by having !
1
= !
2
= 0 , since both of 
these multipliers cannot be positive at the same time. 
 
If they were both positive, and equal, the equality of the prices could still exist according 
to (3.11), but having !
1
positive in (3.13) signifies having si = 0, which inserted in (3.15) 
requires !
2
= 0 . Thus having both multipliers positive is impossible in this model.  
 
With p1 = !p2  there can be different levels of saving since having !
1
= !
2
= 0means that 
si can vary in both (3.13) and (3.15). Since si is added in the first period and subtracted in 
the second period in (3.6), this implies that saving has no net effect on total cost in this 
situation. The reason is that it is multiplied by the same price in both periods. 
 
An important note needs to be made here regarding the individual amounts of saving. We 
see that if the discounted price of the second period is equal, or greater than the price of 
the first period, it opens up for individual savings. If the discounted second period price is 
higher than the first period price, all participants will want to save all permits; a situation 
which I will return to in the next subsection. But if p1 = !p2 , a unique si for each 
individual is not given by this model. 
 
This is explained by (3.11): When prices are equal in present value, the total cost is a 
constant and linear function of s
i
. Thus no unique amount of si can be determined. Many 
solutions are possible, and they all constitute a total cost minimum, since total cost in this 
situation is unaffected by savings. 
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This fact will also have implications for the calculation of the cost. From (3.6) we see that 
knowing x
i
t  we will be able to find C
i
t
(x
i
t
)  for each period. When it comes to the trade 
part of the total cost function, we will not be able to say anything about the individual 
cost of this in each period due to the fact that individual saving is not unique. But across 
the two periods we do find the cost of trading with equal present value prices, since the 
savings cancel itself over the two periods. When I present my numerical results in the 
next chapter, this is reflected in the reporting of the costs.  
 
To conclude, we have found that in the case of a single price-taking participant the 
relationship between the permit prices in the two periods will decide if the participant 
saves permits or not. If the discounted price is higher in the last period than the price in 
the first, the participant will try to save all permits in the market of the first period. If the 
price is higher in the first period, they will not want to save. And finally, if the discounted 
price of period 2 is equal to the price in period 1, there can be saving. And it will not 
necessarily be of all the permits in the market. The amount is however impossible to 
uniquely tell for each individual in this model. 
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3.3.2 The market clearing 
 
The market clearing conditions for the two-period banking model are for all i: 
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 (3.16) 
 
The market constraints in (3.16) represent the logic behind the banking mechanism. In 
the first one, the sum of emission permits being held across all participants in the first 
period cannot be higher than the sum of all endowments in that period. If it was, it would 
mean that they would have to borrow, which is forbidden in this model. If the sum of 
emission permits being held across all participants is less than the total endowment, the 
participants will transfer the left over endowments into the following period. This is the 
sum of savings across all participants. 
 
The second constraint is made in the same way, but here, the sum of emission permits 
being held across all participants can be higher than the total second period endowments. 
The excess demand for permits in this period must however be covered by the sum of 
saved endowments from the first period. 
 
As already discussed, the individual savings cannot be uniquely determined from the 
model. The sum across all participants is however known. The reason is simple: From the 
solution for the individual participants, optimal x
i
t  will be given by the model for each 
participant and the individual endowments, e
i
t , are given exogenously. As long as the 
total endowments across the participants in both periods is lower than the unrestricted 
demand for permits (Business-As-Usual) in both periods, the sum of saving will always 
be the residual between what is held in the first period and that period’s endowments.  
This is why the restrictions hold, even though the individual savings are unknown. 
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The third constraint is the same one as in the single-participant case, it simply states that 
saving cannot be negative. 
 
The last constraint from the single-participant minimization is absent. The reason for this 
is that the restriction s
i
! e
i
1
i=1
n
"  is redundant in a market optimization. Intuitively we 
recall that this restriction limited the individual saving to the total amount of endowments 
across all participants in one period. In a market, with several participants, it is 
impossible that one participant will be able to get all permits available.  
 
Formally, we see that if we set s
i
= e
i
t
i=1
n
!  then si
i=1
n
! = ei
1
i=1
n
! = n ei
t
i=1
n
!
i=1
n
!  which inserted in 
the first market constraint is a contradiction:  
x
i
1
i=1
n
! " ei
1
i=1
n
! + n ei
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n
! # xi
1
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n
! + (n "1) ei
1
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! $ 0   
Thus we omit this restriction in the market case. 
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3.3.3 Computing the equilibrium 
 
In the market version of the two-period banking EPS, the total cost function becomes:  
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and the minimization problem can be expressed: 
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I choose to solve the optimization problem once again setting up a Largrange expression. 
I let µ  and !  be the multipliers on the equality and the inequality constraints 
respectively.  
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  (3.18) 
 
Solving, we find the following first order conditions: 
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s
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The first order conditions for the market (3.19)-(3.21) are the same as the individual 
participant’s first order conditions (3.9)-(3.11). As in the one period model, we see that 
the constant multipliers are proxies for the price, or shadow prices: µ
1
 representing the 
price of permits in the first period, and µ
2
 representing the discounted price of permits in 
period 2.  
 
If we have banking, i.e. a positive saving of permits from period 1 to period 2, !
i
= 0  due 
to (3.22). This means that (3.21) can be expressed as µ
1
= µ
2
.  
 
Remembering that these multipliers are the shadow prices for pollution permits, we can 
state that in a perfect competitive market for pollution permits, with two periods and with 
banking, the price in equilibrium of these permits can rise no faster than the rate of 
interest, from (3.19)-(3.21): µ
1
= µ
2
!"C
i
1
'(x
i
1
) = "#C
i
2
'(x
i
2
) . Which is the same result 
we found in the individual solution when saving occurred. This result is analogue to what 
Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) concludes; participants will have incentives to save if the 
price rises over time with the rate of interest. In the one-period model, the participants 
smooth costs by equaling their marginal abatement costs across sources. This also applies 
for intertemporal trade; marginal abatement costs are equaled across periods. 
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It is quite intuitive to see why this must hold. If the price of permits rose at a rate above 
the interest rate, there would be an infinite demand for permits in period 1 since they 
could be sold in period 2 at a risk free profit. As we have seen, this would lead all 
participants to demand all the permits in the market, which in a market would lead the 
price of permits in period 1 to rise, until the above result is reached.  
 
Formally, if we try to set µ
1
< µ
2
, then !
i
 would have to be negative. From (3.22) we see 
that this is impossible. So with endogenous prices, the discussion we had for the single 
participant wanting to save all the permits in the market is irrelevant. Recalling the 
discussion on the market constraints, this result was expected. 
 
The reverse situation, µ
1
> µ
2
 would only be possible with a positive !
i
, which from 
(3.22) means no saving. Borrowing is restricted from (3.23). 
 
This concludes the presentation of the model. 
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4. Numerical Simulations 
 
In the next section I describe the data I will use in my simulations. Then I make three 
different scenarios for the possible follow-up agreement of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
motivation for making three alternatives is that I want to see how different degrees of 
strictness and participation affects the current commitment period and total cost due to 
banking. The final sections present the results from running the model from chapter three 
with the data and my scenarios for a Post-Kyoto agreement in GAMS. 
 
4.1 The Data and Parameters of the Model 
 
Table 4.1: The Kyoto Protocol 2008-12 (MtC/yr)a 
 1990-emissions Commitment Endowments 
    
USAb 1345 7,00 % 1251 
OECDE 934 7,90 % 860 
Japan 274 6,00 % 258 
CANZ 217 0,70 % 215 
EEFSU 1337 1,70 % 1314 
    
Total 4107 5,10 % 3898 
a This table is taken from Godal and Klaassen (2006) 
b USA never ratified the initial Kyoto Protocol and is thus not actively pursuing their 7% emission 
reduction goal set forth in Kyoto. 
 
All my endowments are, like the Kyoto Protocol reproduced in table 4.1, calculated from 
the base year 1990. The data I use is the world’s energy-related Carbon emissions that 
year. The parameterization in the following is derived from the MERGE model (Model 
for Evaluating the Regional and Global Effects of GHG Reduction policies)5 as they were 
presented in Godal and Klaassen (2003, 2006). In the MERGE model all countries are 
aggregated into relevant regions. Some countries are, due to their relative sizes, left as 
separate regions by themselves. The regions from table 4.1 with the rest of the world are 
shown in table 4.2. They are: OECDE (OECD Europe), EEFSU (Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union), CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), MOPEC (Middle 
                                                
5 For more information, see: http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/ 
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East and OPEC), ROW (Rest of the world), China, USA, Japan and India. These regions 
are preserved and used throughout this thesis.  
 
Table 4.2: Regions of The World in MERGE 
oecde United Kingdom  Hungary  Mopec 
Austria  Iceland  Latvia  Middle east and OPEC 
Belgium  Liechtenstein  Lithuania    
Denmark  Monaco  Poland  Row 
Finland  Norway  Romania  Rest of the world 
France  Switzerland Russian Federation    
Germany   Slovakia  China 
Greece  Japan Slovenia    
Ireland   Ukraine  India 
Italy  Usa   
Luxembourg   Canz  
Netherlands  Eefsu Australia   
Portugal  Bulgaria  Canada   
Spain  Czech Republic  New Zealand  
Sweden  Estonia     
 
4.1.1 The cost function: functional form and parameters 
 
The abatement cost function for the participants is taken from Godal and Klaassen (2003, 
2006) and given by: 
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The parameters are positive, !
i
t
,"
i
t
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> 0 . We remember it is impossible to have 
negative emissions, x
i
! 0  and as defined in chapter 3, the abatement cost function 
satisfies C
i
t
'(x
i
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) < 0  and C
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t
''(x
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) > 0 . In this specific form this gives us a marginal cost 
of emission: 
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The second derivative also fits the assumptions: 
 
C
i
t
''(x
i
t
) = !
i
t  
 
Due to the positive parameter, this must be positive.  
 
A point to be aware of when working with quadratic cost functions, is that we need to 
limit our marginal cost function in the following way, in order to keep it within our 
model: 
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Which simply states that the marginal effect on the cost of more emissions, can never 
become positive. Intuitively, a participant can only reduce cost by increasing emissions. 
Once they reach the level where they no longer can reduce cost by increasing emissions, 
they do not have incentives to rise emissions any more. 
 
At the base of the following numerical simulations are the marginal abatement cost 
function parameters, provided by the International Institute of Applied System Analysis 
(IIASA), based on the already mentioned MERGE model. I have based my simulations 
on these parameters as they where reproduced in Godal and Klaassen (2003, 2006). 
 
The parameters were made by imposing different levels of carbon tax on the model, 
followed by OLS regressions of the data finding linear fits for !
i
t  and !
i
t  parameters in 
the marginal abatement cost function. Table 4.3 shows the parameters including the !
i
t  
parameter that we remember from (4.1). The latter has been calculated by me, the former 
by Godal and Klaassen. I include the !
i
t  parameter as it will be needed later on, when 
calculating the total cost of the different scenarios. It is derived by inserting permit 
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demand levels, x
i
t , equal to Business-As-Usual (BAU) in the cost function. Emission at 
this level imply no cost related to emissions for the participant. Formally:  
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Table 4.3: The Abatement Cost Function Parameters 
 2010 2015 
 !
i
 
(MUSD/yr)  
!
i
 
(USD/tC) 
!
i
 
(USDyr/M(tC)2) 
!
i
 
(MUSD/yr) 
!
i
 
(USD/tC) 
!
i
 
(USDyr/M(tC)2) 
       
usa 912894 1003 0,551 727456 760 0,397 
oecde 977851 1883 1,813 635284 1185 1,105 
japan 302304 1727 4,933 221400 1258 3,574 
canz 108359 693 2,216 97524 611 1,914 
eefsu 633556 1410 1,569 489092 1034 1,093 
china 817388 1383 1,17 792714 1211 0,925 
india 149943 971 3,144 135792 790 2,298 
mopec 275655 1238 2,78 263334 1108 2,331 
row 437488 816 0,761 409996 674 0,554 
 
The notation of the cost function parameters  are such that the marginal cost of emission, 
C
i
t
'(x
i
t
) , is expressed by USD/tC6. Subsequently, this also holds for the marginal 
abatement cost, which is: MAC
i
t
= !C
i
t
'(x
i
t
) . Cost, C
i
t
(x
i
t
) , is expressed in million USD 
per year. The amount of permits held, x
i
t  is expressed by million tons Carbon per year.  
 
The global interest rate assumed throughout the simulations is of 5 % p.a. and the 
discount factor is then: ! =
1
1+ 0,05
"
#$
%
&'
5
= 0,784  for each commitment period. This is 
represented in the GAMS program as a scalar D.  
 
 
                                                
6 In the following, $ represents constant USD of 1997, following Godal and Klaasen (2006). M is million, 
B is billion, t is a metric ton, C is Carbon and yr is year. 
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4.1.2 Business-As-Usual demand 
 
The Business-As-Usual demand (BAU) shown in Table 4.4 are calculated in the event of 
no restrictions on emission, which would mean that the participants would stabilize 
emission at a level where the reduced cost of emitting one more unit of pollution is equal 
to zero. Remembering our marginal cost function from (4.2): C
i
t
'(x
i
t
) = !"
i
t
+ #
i
t
x
i
t  and 
inserting C
i
t
'(x
i
t
) = 0 , this implies a BAU emission level of: x
i
t
=
!
i
t
"
i
t
. 
 
Table 4.4: Business-As-Usual Emissions (MtC/yr) 
 1990a 2010 2015 
    
Usa 1345 1820 1914 
Oecde 934 1039 1072 
Japan 274 350 352 
Canz 217 313 319 
Eefsu 1337 899 946 
China 620 1182 1309 
India 153 309 344 
Mopec 309 445 475 
Row 646 1072 1217 
    
Total 5835 7429 7949 
a The 1990 column is the actual emission for this year. 
 
 
A comment on notation: All emissions are reported as million tons (metric) carbon per 
year (MtC/yr). MtC/yr is a common way of reporting emission, but another widely used 
notation is Mt CO2/yr. To convert from carbon to CO2, we need to relate to the ratio of 
the atomic mass of a carbon dioxide molecule to the atomic mass of a carbon atom 
(44/12). In other words, the USA 1990 emission of Carbon, 1345 MtC/yr equals 
1345*(44/12) = 4932 Mt CO2/yr.7  
 
                                                
7 For more information on conversion, see: http://www.epa.gov/OMS/climate/420f05002.htm#converting 
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4.2 The Scenarios 
 
The three scenarios that will be used as a base for the following simulations are made by 
me as an estimate of what could possibly be expected as a Post-Kyoto agreement (2013-
2017). It is important to emphasize that it is impossible to know at this stage what will be 
agreed upon at the Conference of Parties (COP 15) meeting in Copenhagen 2009 where a 
new agreement is scheduled to be finalized. Just over the past decade politicians’ views 
on the questions regarding climatic change has evolved a lot, and to say today that any 
prediction made on the possible outcome of the Post-Kyoto negotiations is realistic, 
would be naive. I have however tried to take into consideration the different aspects of 
the current political debate when shaping these Post-Kyoto scenarios.  
 
In the following, the endowments consist of permits that each allow the emission of 1 
MtC/yr. 
 
Table 4.5: Endowments in Kyoto, Scenarios and BAU emissiona (MtC/yr) 
 Kyoto 08-12 
(BAU 2010)  
“5% scenario” 13-17 
(BAU 2015) 
“10% scenario” 13-17 
(BAU 2015) 
“World scenario” 13-17 
(BAU 2015) 
     
USA    1345    (1914) 
OECDE 860    (1039) 860    (1072) 841    (1072) 794    (1072) 
Japan 258      (350) 258      (352) 247      (352) 233      (352) 
CANZ 215      (313) 215      (319) 195      (319) 184      (319) 
EEFSU 1314      (899) 1314      (946) 1203      (946) 946      (946) 
China    1309    (1309) 
India    344      (344) 
     
Total  2647   (2601)        2647   (2689)        2486   (2689)        5155   (6257)       
a BAU emission is reported in parenthesis. 
 
From table 4.5 the “hot air” from Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union becomes 
apparent in the Kyoto period when comparing with the BAU-numbers. 46 MtC/yr are 
endowed above the demand for permits without any restrictions. No “hot air” is endowed 
in the scenarios for the next commitment period. 
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The scenarios shown in table 4.5 and can be categorized: 
 
• The “5% scenario”: Kyoto over again. In this scenario, no new regions join the present 
Kyoto countries (excluding USA) in committing to abatement goals. No further 
abatement goals are set, they are stabilized at an average of 5% below 1990-emission 
level. 
 
• The “10% scenario”: The same as “5% scenario”, but in this scenario the existing 
participants agree to abate 10% of 1990-emission level in the second commitment period 
(2013-2017). 
 
• The “World scenario”: USA, China and India agrees to take on emission targets in the 
second commitment period and thus joins the emission trading scheme. OECDE, CANZ, 
and Japan set their emission goals at 15% below 1990-emission levels. USA joins, setting 
their target at their 1990-emission level. EEFSU, China and India set their targets at their 
Business-As-Usual level (BAU 2015). 
 
The rationale for the “World scenario” assumptions is that in the EU-region there is an 
ambition of a 20% abatement by 2020, which will mean close to a 15% goal by 2017. 
This was adopted as official policy on January 23, 20088. It is unlikely that the European 
countries will accept to commit to these goals without the other regions participating 
today setting the same goals. In addition to this, it is unlikely that they will accept this 
without USA accepting abatement targets. If USA joins, it is likely that they will not 
accept the same rigorous goals as the already participating Kyoto nations.  
 
US emissions were in 2005 already 16,3% above 1990-emissions, according to the 
UNFCCC9, and thus to set the goal at 1990-level would mean a quite ambitious goal in 
itself. To abate yet another 15% below 1990-level would mean a real cut of more than 
                                                
8 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm. The 15% abatement target by 2017 is deduced 
by me seeing that the EU has adopted a target of 8% abatement by 2012 through the Kyoto Protocol, and 
20% in 2020, which would put the average target at the end of 2017 to approximately 15%.  
9 http://unfccc.int/ghg_emissions_data/ghg_data_from_unfccc/time_series_annex_i/items/3841.php 
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30% from today to 2017, which in my opinion appear unrealistic. It is however likely that 
the USA will accept some reductions, as all the three front runners for the presidential 
elections in November 2008 are positive to participating in a binding agreement (Point 
Carbon, 2007). 
 
The main caveat for US acceptance of abatement targets will be that China also agrees to 
take on emission goals. China will probably not join without the other main emitter in the 
region, India, agreeing to join. Thus the most likely outcome with US participation also 
includes these two countries. 
 
The arguments being presented by both China and India in the ongoing discussions are 
however that they, as developing countries, should be given the possibilities to develop 
like the already industrialized part of the world. This is why I have granted them 
endowments equal to their BAU emissions in 2015. 
 
The former Soviet Union countries, EEFSU, have been given a lot of “hot air” in the 
present  Kyoto agreement. In 2005 Russia’s emission level was already 28,7% below 
1990-levels, according to UNFCCC, so giving them a 15% reduction goal would mean 
putting more “hot air” into the market. The other large contributor to the “hot air” 
problem in the present agreement, Ukraine, was in 2005 already 55% below their 1990-
level. It is unlikely that the other participants will accept letting these countries increase 
their emission levels, and so giving them BAU emissions of 2015 actually means 
stabilizing them at a 30% reduction or more from 1990-levels. 
 
A comment should be made about the fact that of the Annex 1 countries not only USA, 
but also Australia did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. After their November 24th 2007 
election however, the new prime minister Kevin Rudd made it clear they would ratify the 
existing agreement, and also participate in the talks towards a new agreement.10 At the 
Conference of Parties summit at Bali in December 2007 (COP 13) Australia in fact 
ratified the Protocol. 
                                                
10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/26/australia.climatechange 
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As we can see from the BAU 2015 emissions in table 4.4, the residual emission from row  
(rest of the world) and mopec (middle east and opec) - the non-participating parties in the 
“World scenario” - is 1692 MtC/yr, or 21% of global emissions. Most of these countries 
have already ratified the present Kyoto Protocol, and if there is a post-Kyoto agreement, 
more of these countries could also be taking on emission reduction commitments. 
Due to the relative sizes of the emissions from the other potential committers to the 
“World scenario” agreement, this has not been taken into consideration in these 
simulations in order to be able to follow the MERGE regional setup. 
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4.3 Numerical Results 
 
The model presented in (3.17)-(3.23) has in this section been programmed in the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) using the Mixed Complimentary Problems (MCP) 
solver. In the appendix the GAMS transcript of the “world scenario” is included. The 
other scenarios are simulated in the same way. 
 
The reason for using the MCP solver is simply that this allows me to program the first 
order conditions instead of the objective function. In my model this is an advantage due 
to the properties of my marginal cost function (4.3).  
 
The results are presented with and without banking in order to isolate the effect of the 
banking. GAMS reports that all banking is done by one region. The reason for this 
reporting, as I have explained throughout the presentation in chapter 3, is that banking 
has no unique individual solutions in my model, and is only unique in aggregate terms.  
 
4.3.1 The “5% scenario” 
 
Table 4.6: The “5% scenario” Emission and trade (MtC/yr) 
 With banking Without banking 
 Emissiona Tradeb s Emissiona Tradeb 
 2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17  2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17 
          
OECDE 1039 1072 221 170 42 1039 1058 179 198 
Japan 350 352 92 94 0 350 347 92 89 
CANZ 313 319 98 104 0 313 311 98 96 
EEFSU 899 946 -411 -368 0 899 931 -369 -383 
          
Total: 2601 2689 0 0 42 2601 2647 0 0 
10yr Total 26 450 MtC    26 240 MtC   
a The amount of emission permits each region holds on average per year over the two 5-year periods, x
i
t . 
b For the first period: (x
i
1
! e
i
1
+ s
i
)  and for the second period (x
i
2
! e
i
2
! s
i
) . If the number in this 
column is positive, it means that the region is a net buyer of permits. 
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If the Post-Kyoto agreement is the same as the Kyoto agreement, with the same regions 
participating, our model gives an interesting, yet expected result. From table 4.5 we saw 
that there were 46 permits in excess in the Kyoto period and the amount of permits saved 
from the first period to the second is only 42. The reason is that only 42 MtC/yr is needed 
in the second period to fulfill the Business-As-Usual (BAU) demand for permits there as 
well. Four excess permits are held in period 1, but not saved.  
 
The overall endowments across both periods exceeds the overall BAU demand for 
permits across the two periods. This is “hot air” from the EEFSU region. The emission 
data from UNFCC confirms this, showing that 2005 emissions for Russia is already 
28,7% below their 1990-emission level. 
 
In a situation like this the model from chapter 3 will not be able to give unique individual 
solutions for the amount of permits demanded. The reason is simple: The price collapses, 
as shown in table 4.7, and the last four permits have no cost minimizing effect. From the 
model, it means that the endowments puts the participants at a level of emissions where 
marginal abatement cost is zero, and thus emissions stay at BAU level. The results tell us 
how much emissions each participant will have in the two periods (BAU 2010 and BAU 
2015), but not who will hold the last four permits, since they will not be used. I have 
reported that EEFSU holds them.  
 
It is important to emphasize that this of course is assuming no strategic behavior. 
 
In the non-banking version of the model, we see that there will be a market in the second 
period, as the BAU emissions grows, but not the amount of permits, and no permits can 
be brought forward from the first period. In the Kyoto period of this market, the same 
situation arises as for the banking market; the individual holdings of permits is not known 
uniquely (many solutions satisfies the model) since the amount of permits endowed 
exceeds the BAU demand for permits. I have assumed that EEFSU holds all of the 46 
surplus permits. 
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Notice that total amount of permits held across the 10 years is larger in the banking 
version than in the non-banking version. The difference is 26 450 MtC – 26 240 MtC = 
210 MtC. This can thus be contributed to the “hot air” since this is amount matches 
exactly the saving reported, 42 MtC/yr * 5 yr = 210 MtC. In other words: Due to the “hot 
air”, less abatement is done with banking than without when abatement targets and 
participants are the same as in the Kyoto period.  
 
Table 4.7: "5% scenario" Price and cost  
 With banking Without banking 
 MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) 
 -C’1 -dC’2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b -C’1 -dC’2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b 
             
OECD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 87 2 574 1 331 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 35 1 157 596 
CANZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 51 1 248 649 
EEFSU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 97 -4 979 -2 441 
             
Price  0 0     0 13     
Total   0 0 0 0   0 270 0 135 
a The marginal cost of abatement is reported for both periods, and for the second period it is discounted. 
b The total abatement cost columns in these tables are reported per year. In order to have the total row to 
follow this, I have summed the average from each period with the trade cost, and then divided this by the 
two periods: Total/2= (C1+d*C2+trade)/2. Trade cost is, as discussed in chapter 3, reported across the two 
periods since we do not know individual trade in each period. 
 
Table 4.7 shows that the permit price is zero in the banking version of the market. This is 
because of the “hot air” the EEFSU region has been granted in the Kyoto period.  They 
have enough endowments to cover all their own BAU emissions, and all the other 
regions’ BAU emissions, in both periods. 
 
It is therefore no surprise that the cost of the “5% scenario” is zero for all, as long as the 
market is efficient. 
 
If we did not have banking, we see that in second period, the BAU demand is higher than 
the endowments, and a market price of 13 $/tC would result. As expected, only EEFSU 
makes a profit as they are the only net contributors in the market. Their profit in a non
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banking version of this scenario would be 2,4 B$/yr. The total cost of the agreement 
without banking would be 135 M$/yr. 
 
4.3.2 The “10% scenario” 
 
Table 4.8: “10% scenario” Emission and trade (MtC/yr) 
 With banking Without banking 
 Emissiona Tradeb s Emissiona Tradeb 
 2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17  2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17 
          
OECDE 1022 1038 265 94 103 1039 1002 179 161 
Japan 344 341 86 94 0 350 330 92 83 
CANZ 299 299 84 104 0 313 279 98 84 
EEFSU 879 911 -435 -292 0 899 875 -369 -328 
          
Total: 2544 2589 0 0 103 2601 2486 0 0 
10yr Total 25 665 MtC    25 435 MtC   
a The amount of emission permits each region holds on average per year over the two 5-year periods, x
i
t . 
b For the first period: (x
i
1
! e
i
1
+ s
i
)  and for the second period (x
i
2
! e
i
2
! s
i
) . If the number in this 
column is positive, it means that the region is a net buyer of permits. 
 
 
In Table 4.8 the “10% scenario” is presented, which includes the same regions as in the 
“5% scenario”, but with a more ambitious target of abatement at 10% below 1990-
emission level in the second period. 
 
Notice that in the non-banking version of the market, the same amount of permits are 
demanded in the first period as in the “5% scenario”. The reason is obvious: It is exactly 
the same market as in the first scenario. In the banking version, endowments in the first 
period are also the same, but as the model has been developed in chapter 3, we know that 
the way the regions behave in this period is affected by the design of the scenario, due to 
banking. Thus more permits are saved for the next period, and more abatement is done in 
the first period in this scenario than the previous one. 
 
One of the effects of allowing banking seems to be that more abatement is done in the 
first period compared to the non-banking version of the same scenario. Intuitively it is 
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reasonable to believe that this amount of increased emission abatement matches the 
amount of permits saved, but the amount of abatement shifted from the second period to 
the first due to banking is actually less than the 103 MtC/yr saved.  
 
Comparing with the non-banking version, we see that the real shift in abatement is 103 
MtC/yr – 46 MtC/yr = 57 MtC/yr. This is because without banking, there would already 
be 46 permits in excess, meaning that 46 MtC/yr endowed would never have been 
emitted anyhow, due to “hot air” in EEFSU. All of these permits are saved, since the 
second period endowments are stricter. 
 
As in the previous scenario, also here total abatement in the banking version is less than 
in the non-banking version. And yet again, it is explained by the “hot air”. Finding the 
difference: 25 665 MtC – 25 435 MtC = 230 MtC, which is more than in the first 
scenario, due to the fact that this time, all the 46 MtC/yr that are in excess each year of 
the Kyoto period are saved. 46 MtC/yr * 5 yr = 230 MtC. 
 
Table 4.9: "10% scenario" Price and cost  
 With banking Without banking 
 MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) 
 -C’1 -d*C’2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b -C’1 -dC’*2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b 
             
OECD 30 30 250 507 10 770 5 764 0 61 0 2 136 9 821 5 978 
Japan 30 30 92 169 5 400 2 830 0 61 0 677 5 063 2 870 
CANZ 30 30 209 307 5 640 3 078 0 61 0 1 214 5 124 3 169 
EEFSU 30 30 303 525 -21 810 -10 491 0 61 0 2 161 -20 008 -8 923 
             
Price 30 30     0 61     
Total   854 1 509 0 1 181   0 6 188 0 3 094 
a The marginal cost of abatement is reported for both periods, and for the second period it is discounted. 
b The total abatement cost columns in these tables are reported per year. In order to have the total row to 
follow this, I have summed the average from each period with the trade cost, and then divided this by the 
two periods: Total/2= (C1+d*C2+trade)/2. Trade cost is, as discussed in chapter 3, reported across the two 
periods since we do not know individual trade in each period. 
 
As expected, in this second scenario we see that there is a positive price for emission 
permits in the banking version of the market as well. The price of 30 $/tC means that for 
all the regions involved, it is beneficial to abate more in the first period of this scenario 
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than in the “5% scenario”. We see from tables 4.6 and 4.8 that this in fact happens. The 
reason is that abating today means more excess permits to save for the next period, so the 
participants can better smooth their costs so that the emission is done when of least cost. 
 
What also becomes apparent here as well is that banking shaves costs. Across the two 
periods, the banking version of “10% scenario” cost 1,2 B$/yr while the non-banking 
version cost 3,1 B$/yr or 158% more. The explanation mirrors the argument above; due 
to cost smoothing, abatement is not only done where it is of least cost, but also when it is 
of least cost. 
 
The overall abatement cost reduction due to banking is in this scenario 3,1 B$/yr – 1,2 
B$/yr = 1,9 B$/yr. Remembering that the increased emissions due to banking was 46 
MtC/yr, we see that each ton increase in Carbon emission per year caused by banking, 
saves 41 USD.  
 
The Kyoto period of the non-banking version is once again equal to the same period in 
the first scenario. This means that the same “hot air” is floating around in the market, 
giving everyone enough endowments to go around, while in the stricter Post-Kyoto 
period, abatement must happen and the cost of compliance rise. The permit price is also 
double that of the banking market in the second non-banking period. 
 
Another interesting point to be made is that in this banking version, the profit EEFSU is 
making, 10,5 B$/yr, is almost equal to the aggregated cost of the rest of the regions (11,7 
B$/yr). It is also noticeable that the aggregate cost of the agreement across all regions is 
less than the individual cost for any of the participants, excluding EEFSU. 
 
Finally, it is worth remembering that in (3.6) the saving is added in the first period and 
subtracted in the second. Both times it is multiplied by the same price (in the case where 
we actually have saving). This explains why, in the cost tables, banking is not included, 
since across the two periods, the banking cancels itself out. Still, its effects are apparent 
enough through the abatement, overall cost and price of permits. 
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4.3.3 The “World scenario” 
 
Table 4.10: "World scenario" Emission and trade (MtC/yr) 
 With banking Without banking 
(MtC/yr) Emissiona Tradeb s Emissiona Tradeb 
 2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17  2008-12 2013-17 2008-12 2013-17 
          
USA 1820 1586 0 241 0 1820 1497 0 152 
OECDE 982 955 357 -74 235 1039 923 179 129 
Japan 329 316 71 83 0 350 306 92 73 
CANZ 267 251 52 67 0 313 233 98 49 
EEFSU 834 827 -480 -119 0 899 794 -369 -152 
China 1182 1168 0 -141 0 1182 1130 0 -179 
India 309 287 0 -57 0 309 272 0 -72 
          
Total: 5723 5390 0 0 235 5912 5155 0 0 
10yr Total 55 565 MtC    55 335 MtC   
a The amount of emission permits each region holds on average per year over the two 5-year periods, x
i
t . 
b For the first period: (x
i
1
! e
i
1
+ s
i
)  and for the second period: (x
i
2
! e
i
2
! s
i
) . If the number in this 
column is positive, it means that the region is a net buyer of permits. 
 
In this final scenario, three new regions are included in the market in the second period: 
USA, China and India.  Observe that they are given their Business-As-Usual demands as 
endowment and emission in the first period, but are restricted from trading. This is done 
for programming purposes.  
 
In this scenario 235 MtC/yr is saved. This is substantial, and even taking away the 
surplus endowments (46 MtC/yr), this means 189 MtC/yr is abated in the first period 
solely due to banking. A considerable shift of abatement almost the size of CANZ entire 
1990-emissions, and more than India’s 1990-emissions, every year.  
 
In this scenario for the first time, other regions than EEFSU are net contributors of 
permits. Both China and India joins EEFSU as the providers of permits in the market. 
However, it is worth noticing that neither China nor India has been granted any “hot air”, 
as EEFSU has in the first period. Actually, they have only been granted their BAU 
demand. This follows our theory; even though no restrictions are put on these countries, 
they still choose to sell, because they make a larger profits by selling permits and reduce 
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emission. This falls in line with the basic permit trade theory: the abatement is done 
where, and when, the cost of abatement is lowest. It is reasonable to assume that in 
developing economies there are more inexpensive ways of abating emission, than in more 
technologically advanced economies. 
 
OECDE is also a net seller in the second period of this banking market. This is due to the 
fact that all the saving has been attributed to them. This could have been divided among 
all the participants, and the results would still hold, knowing that saving cannot be known 
uniquely. 
 
In the non-banking version of the market, all of the net contributors to the market sell 
more permits than in the banking version. The main explanation for this is that since no 
permits are being brought into the market from the previous period, the demand is higher  
relative to supply than in the banking-market. We also see, as expected, that in the non-
banking market, more abatement is done in the second period than in the same period in 
the banking version.  
 
And finally, once again we see that total emissions across the two periods in the banking 
version is higher than total emissions in the non-banking version of the market. Not 
surprisingly, the difference over the 10 yr period is 230 MtC, which, as in the “10% 
scenario”, is equal to the sum of the five years of “hot air” excess endowments. 
 
The banking mechanism does however shift the abatement so that isolated to the first 
period, the banking version provides more abatement.  
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Table 4.11: "World scenario" Price and cost 
 With banking Without banking 
 MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) MACa ($/tC) Cost (M$/yr) 
 -C’1 -dC’2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b -C’1 -dC’2 C1 d*C2 trade total/2b 
             
USA 0 102 0 16 779 24 582 20 681 0 130 0 27 108 19 760 23 434 
OECD 102 102 2 905 5 952 28 866 18 861 0 130 0 9 645 16 770 13 208 
Japan 102 102 1 097 1 814 15 708 9 310 0 130 0 2 963 9 490 6 226 
CANZ 102 102 2 317 3 493 12 138 8 974 0 130 0 5 578 6 370 5 974 
EEFSU 102 102 3 280 6 069 -61 098 -25 874 0 130 0 9 902 -19 760 -4 929 
China 0 102 0 7 228 -14 382 -3 577 0 130 0 11 643 -23 270 -5 814 
India 0 102 0 2 904 -5 814 -1 455 0 130 0 4 641 -9 360 -2 359 
             
Price 102 102     0 130     
Total   9 599 44 239 0 26 919   0 71 480 0 35 740 
a The marginal cost of abatement is reported for both periods, and for the second period it is discounted. 
b The total abatement cost columns in these tables are reported per year. In order to have the total row to 
follow this, I have summed the average from each period with the trade cost, and then divided this by the 
two periods: Total/2= (C1+d*C2+trade)/2. Trade cost is, as discussed in chapter 3, reported across the two 
periods since we do not know individual trade in each period. 
 
In the final scenario we see that not only EEFSU is making a profit in the market, but 
also China and India. This echoes table 4.10 where they all are net contributors to the 
market of emission permits. 
 
The price of permits has risen considerably with the inclusion of the large emitters. USA 
puts great pressure on demand in the second period, and it makes the price surge 
compared to the other scenarios. In the second period of the non-banking version of the 
market, we see that the price rise to 130 $/tC, while banking releases some of the pressure 
in the last period, where the price is 102 $/tC. Once again it is noticeable that the 
aggregated cost in the banking version of the market, 26,9 B$/yr, is less than what it 
would have been without banking 35,7 B$/yr, although this time the non-banking version 
is only 33% more expensive. In absolute terms, a saving of 8,8 B$/yr means that banking 
saves 88 B$ across the two periods (10 years) across all participants.  
 
In this scenario, the cost saving per extra emitted ton of Carbon per year due to banking is 
(35,7-26,9) B$/yr / 46 MtC/yr = 191 USD/tC which is considerably higher than the 41 
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USD/tC in the “10% scenario”. This hints towards banking being more efficient in a 
stricter agreement. 
 
In contrast to the “10% scenario”, the aggregate cost of the banking market, 26,9 B$/yr, 
is more than any of the individual costs. Also, EEFSU is no longer reaping all the profits. 
Due to the fact that China and India choose to abate rather than to utilize all of their own 
endowments, we see that both of these countries are making a profit as well, although 
considerably less than EEFSU. The latter still makes a profit that is larger than any of the 
other regions cost, even though they abate more emissions in both periods in this 
scenario. 
 
In both the “10% scenario” and in the “world scenario” we see that the banking reduces 
emission in the short run (first commitment period) and makes the total cost of abatement 
across both periods fall. In the first period the cost of abatement is higher for the 
participants with banking.  This is obvious, since without banking there are no costs in 
the first period. In the second period the cost of abatement for all is lower with banking; 
also intuitive considering that they abate more in the first period. 
 
In the “10% scenario” all the participants benefit from banking across both periods; 
EEFSU makes more profit, and the others have lower total abatement costs. In the “world 
scenario”, only USA and EEFSU are better off with banking. For the others, the non-
banking market actually gives them less overall cost per year, or more profit per year, in 
the case of China and India. A reason for this can be that the price of permits in the non-
banking second period is higher. For a big permit buyer like USA, who is not 
participating in the market in the first period, and is thus excluded from banking, a lower 
price is preferred. For EEFSU, a price equal to zero in the first period means large losses, 
since they sell 369 permits in this period. China and India does not feel this effect, since 
they are only allowed to sell in the second period anyway, so they make more profit 
without banking.  
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5. Discussion and Limitations 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to numerically analyze the effect of banking on the 
first two commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol. In order to do this I have presented a 
model on emission trade with banking across two periods and I have made assumptions 
regarding three scenarios of how the second period endowments can be. Finally these 
scenarios has been programmed in GAMS with cost functions from the MERGE model. 
 
This analysis has important limitations: The assumptions of the model; the parameters 
and data I use; the fact that I have not looked at the efficiency of banking compared to a 
social optimum; and some limitations regarding the scenarios themselves. In the 
following I will briefly comment on this.  
 
Maybe the most important weakness of the model is that it assumes no strategic behavior. 
As Manne and Richels (2004) point out, the majority of the “hot air” in the first 
commitment period is concentrated in a few countries in the EEFSU region; mainly 
Russia and the Ukraine. Godal and Meland (2006) investigate coalition formation in a 
static environment (one-period) and emphasize that there are no formal hurdles for 
coalition formations in the Kyoto Protocol. One of the points they make is that just as 
strategic behavior on the supply side  can push prices up, strategic behavior on the buyer 
side can work in the opposite direction. They suggest gains from equilibrium cartels 
involving both large sellers and buyers. I will not speculate on how strategic behavior 
would affect my results over two periods, but taking into consideration that the first 
commitment period has already started, and that the second period has not yet been 
agreed upon, it is not controversial to assume that some strategic behavior could take 
place, and is worth investigating in a two period framework. 
 
The absence of borrowing could also be discussed as a limitation of the model. However, 
seeing from chapter three that this would be interesting when prices fall from period 1 to 
period 2, and knowing that in the numerical results the permit price without banking was 
equal to zero, I do not consider this as of major importance in this analysis. 
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Regarding the parameters and data I use, the most important limitation is that they do not 
include non-energy related carbon emissions, non-Carbon greenhouse gas emissions and 
the Clean Development Mechanism. Godal and Klaassen (2006) suggest that including 
this would most likely contribute to a lower permit price.  
 
Also, Manne and Richels (2004) stress that US emission in 2010 might be lower than 
anticipated by the MERGE model, due to the fact that the energy sector might be 
anticipating future emission restrictions. 
 
As Kling and Rubin (1997) highlights, what is good for the participant in a banking 
model, is not always good for society. Their modified banking model restricts borrowing, 
as I have done. I have however not investigated whether or not a rise in the price of 
permits at the rate of the interest rate is socially optimal, which is what I find with 
banking. Comparing to environmental models it could be that in order to limit climatic 
change, the price should rise faster. Manne and Richels (2001) as cited in Godal and 
Klaassen (2006), use MERGE to investigate optimal emission paths constrained by a 
maximum rise of the average temperature of 2 degrees Celsius in the period 2000-2100. 
Their findings suggest that carbon price rises approximately by the rate of interest. This 
could mean that the results I find are close to efficient, but this could have been 
investigated more.  
 
Another question that I do not examine is how banking affects technological 
development. Phaneuf and Requate (2002) find that in some cases permit banking can 
substitute investment spending. Their argument is that under a policy that does not allow 
banking, technological investments is the option they have to smooth abatement costs, 
and that allowing banking will lead to a suboptimal investment level.    
 
Finally, caution has to be taken when considering the results of this thesis due to the fact 
that the political process leading up to the signing of  new agreement is very 
unpredictable, and thus there is much uncertainty regarding the composition of my 
scenarios.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
If shifting emission abatement forward in time is a policy objective, than banking is a 
valuable tool of the emission permit trade in the Kyoto framework. The caveat is that in 
the two period world I have simulated, the second period abatement goals need to be 
stricter, or more countries must accept emission targets, than in the Kyoto period. If it is 
not, this effect is lost.  
 
According to the IPCC (2007), it will be important to reduce emission sooner, rather than 
later to prevent adverse climatic changes. Banking has the property of helping achieve 
this even though it takes time for national governments to accept that a price has to be 
paid in order to limit the effects of global warming. If large emitters do not join until a 
later period, the effect of a stricter agreement in this period can still lead to more 
abatement in the previous period when banking is allowed. 
 
The other main conclusion from this thesis is that banking makes abatement goals 
achievable at a lower cost. Based on my scenarios there is a considerable cost saving 
element in banking for the overall compliance cost. As we have seen from the results, this 
is due to the cost smoothing that the participants are able to make across the two periods 
when banking is an option.  
 
In the “world scenario” it is worth noting that the only two regions that were better off in 
the yearly average costs with banking were the USA and EEFSU. The rest of the 
participants were better off individually without banking. This effect is important to bear 
in mind when shaping the new agreement. For all participants, banking did have a 
smoothing effect however; costs were divided over the two periods, instead of being all 
in the second period, which is the case without banking.  
 
The major profits the EEFSU is making in the banking version of the “world scenario” 
could become an obstacle when developing the next agreement. This profit has its roots 
in the “hot air” from the Kyoto agreement. Banking makes abatement happen in the first 
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commitment period, even though there is “hot air” in this period and is thus valuable in 
this regards. The financial implications this has could however in my opinion pose a 
serious threat to the development of the Post-Kyoto agreement due to the fact that the 
cost saving of banking in the “world scenario” is mainly due to the large profits EEFSU 
is making.  
 
As discussed, my assumptions, the model and therefore also my simulations have 
important shortcomings. In particular, the numeric values for cost and abatement should 
be treated with much caution. Even so I am still of the opinion that these numerical 
results do show that banking can achieve the desired effects if a new agreement is in 
place. 
 
The fact that banking has short term effects on abatement and cost saving properties 
overall, makes it a strong tool when going into the next commitment period, and beyond.
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8. Appendix 
 
THE GAMS RUNS: 
GAMS Rev 148  x86/MS Windows                            03/22/08 
15:11:24 Page 1 
The Post-Kyoto 3 Protocol 
C o m p i l a t i o n 
 
 
   2    
   3  SET I    Agents / China, USA, OECD, JAPAN, CANZ, EEFSU, India /; 
   4    
   5  * USA, India og Kina er bare med i andre periode 
   6    
   7    
   8  * Data 
   9    
  10  SCALAR D discount factor/ 
  11    
  12             0.7836  /; 
  13    
  14  PARAMETER b1(i) abatement cost parameter b1 / 
  15  India        971 , 
  16  China       1383 , 
  17  USA         1003 , 
  18  OECD        1883 , 
  19  JAPAN       1727 , 
  20  CANZ         693 , 
  21  EEFSU       1410 /; 
  22    
  23  PARAMETER d1(i) abatement cost parameter d1 / 
  24  India       3.144  , 
  25  China        1.17  , 
  26  USA         0.551  , 
  27  OECD        1.813  , 
  28  JAPAN       4.933  , 
  29  CANZ        2.216  , 
  30  EEFSU       1.569  /; 
  31    
  32  PARAMETER e1(i) initial permit allocation 1 / 
  33  India        309   , 
  34  China       1182   , 
  35  USA         1820   , 
  36  OECD         860   , 
  37  JAPAN        258   , 
  38  CANZ         215    , 
  39  EEFSU       1314   /; 
  40    
  41  PARAMETER b2(i) abatement cost parameter b2 / 
  42  India        790   , 
  43  China       1211   , 
  44  USA          760   , 
  45  OECD        1185   , 
  46  JAPAN       1258   , 
  47  CANZ         611   , 
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  48  EEFSU       1034   /; 
  49    
  50  PARAMETER d2(i) abatement cost parameter d2 / 
  51  India       2.298  , 
  52  China       0.925  , 
  53  USA         0.397  , 
  54  OECD        1.105  , 
  55  JAPAN       3.574  , 
  56  CANZ        1.914  , 
  57  EEFSU       1.093  /; 
  58    
  59  PARAMETER e2(i) initial permit allocation 2/ 
  60  India       344    , 
  61  China      1309    , 
  62  USA        1345    , 
  63  OECD        794    , 
  64  JAPAN       233    , 
  65  CANZ        184    , 
  66  EEFSU       946   /; 
  67    
  68  * Variables 
  69    
  70  POSITIVE VARIABLE 
  71    
  72           p1            permit price 1, 
  73           p2            permit price 2, 
  74           lambda(i)     shadow price on saving; 
  75    
  76  VARIABLE 
  77           x1(i)         final allocation 1, 
  78           x2(i)         final allocation 2, 
  79           s(i)          saving; 
  80    
  81    
  82  * Equations 
  83    
  84  EQUATIONS 
  85           FOB_x1(i)        first order condition x1, 
  86           FOB_x2(i)        first order condition x2, 
  87           FOB_s(i)         first order condition s, 
  88           CLEAR1           clearing condition 1, 
  89           CLEAR2           clearing condition 2, 
  90           CONSTRAINT_s(i)  no-borrow condition; 
  91    
  92  FOB_x1(i)..          min( 0, -b1(i) + d1(i)*x1(i) ) + p1 =e= 0; 
  93    
  94  FOB_x2(i)..          D* min( 0, -b2(i) + d2(i)*x2(i) ) + p2 =e= 
0; 
  95    
  96  FOB_s(i)..           p1 - p2 - lambda(i) =e= 0; 
  97    
  98  CLEAR1..             - sum(i, x1(i)) + sum(i, e1(i)) - sum(i, 
s(i)) =e= 0; 
  99    
 100  CLEAR2..             - sum(i, x2(i)) + sum(i, e2(i)) + sum(i, 
s(i)) =e= 0; 
 101    
 102  CONSTRAINT_s(i)..    s(i) =g= 0; 
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 103    
 104  s.up("India")=0; 
 105  s.up("USA")=0; 
 106  s.up("China")=0; 
 107  x1.lo("India")=309; 
 108  x1.up("India")=309; 
 109  x1.lo("USA")=1820; 
 110  x1.up("USA")=1820; 
 111  x1.lo("China")=1182; 
 112  x1.up("China")=1182; 
 113    
 114  MODEL Kvote / 
 115  FOB_x1.x1, 
 116  FOB_x2.x2, 
 117  FOB_s.s 
 118  CLEAR1.p1, 
 119  CLEAR2.p2, 
 120  CONSTRAINT_s.lambda /; 
 121    
 122    
 123  SOLVE kvote USING MCP; 
 
S O L V E      S U M M A R Y 
 
     MODEL   Kvote                
     TYPE    MCP                  
     SOLVER  PATH                FROM LINE  123 
 
**** SOLVER STATUS     1 NORMAL COMPLETION          
**** MODEL STATUS      1 OPTIMAL                    
 
 RESOURCE USAGE, LIMIT          0.187      1000.000 
 ITERATION COUNT, LIMIT        86         10000 
 EVALUATION ERRORS              0             0 
 
*** You do not have a license for this solver. 
*** Continue to run in demonstration mode. 
 
 
PATH-C        Jun  1, 2007 WIN.PT.NA 22.5 025.037.041.VIS Path 4.7.00 
 
27 row/cols, 75 non-zeros, 10.29% dense. 
 
Path 4.7.00 (Tue May 29 14:27:30 2007) 
Written by Todd Munson, Steven Dirkse, and Michael Ferris 
 
INITIAL POINT STATISTICS 
Maximum of X. . . . . . . . . .  0.0000e+000 var: (s(OECD)) 
Maximum of F. . . . . . . . . .  5.1550e+003 eqn: (CLEAR2) 
Maximum of Grad F . . . . . . .  4.9330e+000 eqn: (FOB_x1(JAPAN)) 
                                            var: (x1(JAPAN)) 
 
INITIAL JACOBIAN NORM STATISTICS 
Maximum Row Norm. . . . . . . .  8.0000e+000 eqn: (CLEAR2) 
Minimum Row Norm. . . . . . . .  1.3111e+000 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Maximum Column Norm . . . . . .  8.0000e+000 var: (p2) 
Minimum Column Norm . . . . . .  1.3111e+000 var: (x2(USA)) 
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FINAL STATISTICS 
Inf-Norm of Complementarity . .  1.9619e-009 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Inf-Norm of Normal Map. . . . .  1.9619e-009 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Inf-Norm of Minimum Map . . . .  1.9618e-009 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Inf-Norm of Fischer Function. .  1.9619e-009 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Inf-Norm of Grad Fischer Fcn. .  1.0394e-009 eqn: (FOB_x1(EEFSU)) 
Two-Norm of Grad Fischer Fcn. .  2.2270e-009 
 
FINAL POINT STATISTICS 
Maximum of X. . . . . . . . . .  1.5863e+003 var: (x2(USA)) 
Maximum of F. . . . . . . . . .  1.9619e-009 eqn: (FOB_x2(USA)) 
Maximum of Grad F . . . . . . .  4.9330e+000 eqn: (FOB_x1(JAPAN)) 
                                            var: (x1(JAPAN)) 
 
 
---- EQU FOB_x1  first order condition x1 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China      .      101.988      .     1182.000 REDEF 
USA        .      101.868      .     1820.000 REDEF 
OECD       .         .         .      982.323       
JAPAN      .         .         .      329.404       
CANZ       .         .         .      266.675       
EEFSU      .         .         .      833.621       
India      .      102.048      .      309.000 REDEF 
 
---- EQU FOB_x2  first order condition x2 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China      .         .         .     1168.400       
USA        .         .         .     1586.322       
OECD       .         .         .      954.543       
JAPAN      .         .         .      315.548       
CANZ       .         .         .      251.186       
EEFSU      .         .         .      826.871       
India      .         .         .      287.106       
 
---- EQU FOB_s  first order condition s 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China      .         .         .         .          
USA        .         .         .         .          
OECD       .         .         .      234.976       
JAPAN      .         .         .         .          
CANZ       .         .         .         .          
EEFSU      .         .         .         .          
India      .         .         .         .          
 
                       LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
---- EQU CLEAR1     -5958.000 -5958.000 -5958.000   102.048       
---- EQU CLEAR2     -5155.000 -5155.000 -5155.000   102.048       
 
  CLEAR1  clearing condition 1 
  CLEAR2  clearing condition 2 
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---- EQU CONSTRAINT_s  no-borrow condition 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China      .         .        +INF       .          
USA        .         .        +INF       .          
OECD       .      234.976     +INF       .          
JAPAN      .         .        +INF       .          
CANZ       .         .        +INF       .          
EEFSU      .         .        +INF       .          
India      .         .        +INF       .          
 
                       LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
---- VAR p1              .      102.048     +INF       .          
---- VAR p2              .      102.048     +INF       .          
 
  p1  permit price 1 
  p2  permit price 2 
 
---- VAR lambda  shadow price on saving 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China      .         .        +INF       .          
USA        .         .        +INF       .          
OECD       .         .        +INF    234.976       
JAPAN      .         .        +INF       .          
CANZ       .         .        +INF       .          
EEFSU      .         .        +INF       .          
India      .         .        +INF       .          
 
---- VAR x1  final allocation 1 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China  1182.000  1182.000  1182.000   101.988       
USA    1820.000  1820.000  1820.000   101.868       
OECD      -INF    982.323     +INF       .          
JAPAN     -INF    329.404     +INF       .          
CANZ      -INF    266.675     +INF       .          
EEFSU     -INF    833.621     +INF       .          
India   309.000   309.000   309.000   102.048       
 
---- VAR x2  final allocation 2 
 
         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China     -INF   1168.400     +INF       .          
USA       -INF   1586.322     +INF       .          
OECD      -INF    954.543     +INF       .          
JAPAN     -INF    315.548     +INF       .          
CANZ      -INF    251.186     +INF       .          
EEFSU     -INF    826.871     +INF       .          
India     -INF    287.106     +INF       .          
 
---- VAR s  saving 
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         LOWER     LEVEL     UPPER    MARGINAL 
 
China     -INF       .         .         .          
USA       -INF       .         .         .          
OECD      -INF    234.976     +INF       .          
JAPAN     -INF       .        +INF       .          
CANZ      -INF       .        +INF       .          
EEFSU     -INF       .        +INF       .          
India     -INF       .         .         .          
 
 
**** REPORT SUMMARY :        0     NONOPT 
                             0 INFEASIBLE 
                             0  UNBOUNDED 
                             3  REDEFINED (REDEF) 
                             0     ERRORS 
 
